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WELL-WORN story has an anxious old lady say to her granddaughter: "My dear, do me a great favor and promise to stop
k
using two words. One of them is 'swell' and the other is 'lousy.' "
To which the child dutifully replies: "Why, of course, grandmother. Just
tell me what the words are."
My trouble also is with two words, and I will tell you what they are.
One of them is "conventional" and the other is "ingenious." If you deem
my remarks conventional, you will ipsofacto tag them as not worth hearing; and if you term them ingenious, you will have applied what to a
lawyer is a subtly fatal description. Show me an opinion which characterizes as "ingenious" the argument of one side, and I need read no more to
know who has lost the case. Between conventionality on the right and
ingenuity on the left lies but a narrow and tortuous channel which I may
not be able to navigate. One promise only will I make: that if there is a
shipwreck, it shall be on the left hand shore.
This sinister assurance results from pessimistic appreciation of what has
happened, in connection with the law of evidence, to those explorers and
toilers who have confined their exertions to the right bank. They have, at
least recently, found it on the whole a region of laborious futility. Most
lawyers who do any thinking will agree that the art of proof in American
courts suffers from serious distortions. Confusion, misunderstanding,
anomaly, and inconsistency are only too commonly displayed. But efforts
to square the pattern by frankly exposing the wandering roots of old mistakes and seeking the overruling of the cases which embody them have
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met, even in this Wigmorean era, only rather rare and undistinguished
success. Piecemeal reform by legislation has been proving almost incredibly difficult. The law-maker seems even less inclined to yield to sweet
reasonableness than does the judge. And I doubt whether any well-informed practitioner would bet much on the wide and speedy adoption of
the wholesale reform which the American Law Institute is going to offer
in the form of a code.
All these complete or partial failures involve conventional attacks upon
obstructive errors. There remains for measurably hopeful consideration
the possibility of an occasional unconventional thrust by means of novel
analysis, boldly applied in the trial of causes. The jaded modern brain,
even in a judicial head, may react more briskly to sharp and sudden shock
than to dull, deliberate commonplace. And, if we must in some degree
respect convention, an informed mind-I had almost stumbled into saying
an ingenious one !-which plans such a thrust can pick up, by rummaging
through the welter of evidentiary decisions, bits of judicial reasoning sufficient to furnish at least a sheath of precedent for disguising the virgin
steel of his dagger.
The case of Shenton v. Tyler,' argued to an English court of appeal in
January 1939, seems an excellent illustration, because in it a surprise
attack upon a generally accepted major premise completely upset a conventional applecart. Complainant sued to enforce a secret trust obligation. The obligation was asserted to have arisen out of a confidential communication made to respondent by her husband, since deceased. Complainant sought to interrogate respondent about the communication; respondent refused to answer; the judge of first instance sustained the refusal, and complainant appealed. The published summary of argument
by claimant's counsel indicates a shrewdly planned approach to a radical
suggestion. These gentlemen realized full well that anybody who thinks
he knows anything about the Anglo-American law of evidence is confident of the existence of an "old common law rule" that neither spouse
"could be compelled to divulge [marital communications] even when the
marriage is at an end.' 2 Counsel began by seeming to recognize this
privilege but with a suggestion that it failed to cover a "trust ....not intended to be kept secret after the death of the person creating it," and
that the immediate use of the privilege was unconscionable and should be
prevented. Counsel added that a subsequently created statutory privilege
[ 1939] 1 Ch.620.
2 The

quoted passages are from the summary of argument in the Law Reports.
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endured only so long as the marriage did, and then swung boldly on their
fundamental point. The supposed common law privilege, they said, had
"no authority establishing it," and they challenged respondent to demonstrate its existence. Opposing counsel made the orthodox answer: "If this
contention were correct, it is remarkable that the text-books all assume
the existence of the privilege at common law." Whereafter the judges
went to work upon the problem and about two months later emerged with
the unanimous conclusion--one of them frankly expressing "some surprise
at the reslt"1-that there has never been in England any common law
privilege whatever peculiar to private communications between husband
and wife. This pronouncement, the court believed, required the overruling
of not a single decision, although it did necessitate disapproval of some
judicial dicta and numerous assertions and assumptions of text writers.
The court also agreed with complainant's contention as to the limited
durability of the statutory privilege and therefore allowed the appeal.
Commenting upon this decision The Law Quarterly Review 4 says:
"From the purely legal standpoint .... [it] is almost the ideal case, for it
contains ingenious and difficult problems. .

.

. , and is not complicated by

being of any practical importance at all." The lethal word! "Ingenious"
-enough said. However, for purposes of our immediate discussion, I can
put before you a general topic and a particular problem which may have
very painful practical consequences indeed.
It must be agreed, of course, that the kind of attack proposed will get
nowhere with a really hidebound judiciary. But, if you seek to trip me by
suggesting the difficulty of finding an open-minded jurisdiction, I respond
by retiring into the Commonwealth of Ames and inviting you to follow
me. This famous community, in which I spend practically my entire professional life, exists to satisfy the litigious needs of the Law School of
Harvard University. It is unknown to the atlas and has no visible representation in Congress. Yet it is one of the states of the United States. In
its great vaulted court room have sat Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States and of the highest state courts, as well as judges of the
lower federal tribunals. Ames is a fit subject for the poet. It contains
everything essential for law suits, including
.... cities of men,
And manners, climates, councils, governments.
[ig3g] i Ch. 62o, 636.
4 55

L.Q. Rev. 329

(1939);

but see Holdsworth's comment in 56 L.Q. Rev. 137 (,940).
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For example, a brilliant literary man of Ames thus depicted one of the
commonwealth's greatest inhabitants:
Now Williston lives in a zoo
With beasts suppositious.
There's John's white horse, and Peter's too,
One eyed and very vicious.
Canary birds are flitting by
With vigor undiminishedBut all these animals will die
Before the contract's finishedis
Everything in Ames leads to orderly litigation. Yet, oddly enough, Ames
cannot be called
A land of settled government,
A land of just and old renown,
Where Freedom slowly broadens down
From precedent to precedent.
For Ames never, never has a precedent on all fours or even in point with
respect to the case at bar. Ames is so open-minded a jurisdiction that,
until now, she has lacked any legal history. I am going to give her some.
Not very long ago-as you can tell for yourselves from the subsequent
citation of more than one 1940 case by counsel-the presiding judge in a
civil session of the Ames trial court of general jurisdiction came back to
the bench full of the certitude which arises out of a good lunch, directed a
verdict, stilled the wailings of defeated counsel, and cleared the decks for
his next case. While the clerk spun his little wooden barrel, pulled slips
therefrom, and called the names of jurymen, His Honor looked over the
papers. At first glance the suit seemed common enough-a motor vehicle
collision case-but the judge's eye began to catch on little oddities. To
begin with, the name of the plaintiff, a millionaire munitions manufacturer turned philanthropist, whose wife was said to have an insatiable
yearning for the company of literary lions; second, the fact that nothing
but property damage was claimed; third, the names of counsel. For the
defense appeared no less a person than Henry Stout. Stout tried for insurance companies often enough, and an insurance company was indicated
as the real defendant here, but Stout was far too costly an advocate for
any ordinary small case. The judge knew him, professionally and otherwise. He was a vigorous, erect, thick-set man aware of all the standard
court room moves and not hesitant to make them. He affected a style of
s Plimpton, In Personam 25 (privately printed 1925). Cf. Williston, Life and Law 205 (1940).
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advocacy solid and assured. Part of his stock in trade was belligerent confidence in the righteousness of his clients, and a rather shocked contempt
for the motives and behavior of their opponents. Somebody-either Mr.
Stout or the client-must be pretty hot under the collar over this collision litigation. The judge and Mr. Stout attended the same church. Mr.
Stout's pew bore a large sign "RESERVED." So did the judge's. But
His Honor felt there was a difference. Mr. Stout always acted as if the
word on his sign began with the letter "D" instead of the letter "R."
Somehow the judge did not much like Mr. Stout.
For the plaintiff appeared one Thorne, a youngish lawyer, son of a
highly successful inventor of fulminating materials who had unfortunately
invented once too often and died in the explosion of his final achievement.
The father, His Honor remembered, had been very serviceable in the
plaintiff's factory. Probably that explained half the line-up in the immediate case. Young Thorne did not usually work for millionaires. His
clientele was shifting. He won some hard cases and lost a lot of apparently
easy ones. His methods, many of the bench thought, were to blame. Some
deemed him brilliant but unbalanced. They pointed to his father's resounding finish and suggested that the son would maintain family tradition. One judge had likened young Thorne to the irrepressible Wildy
Wright, who after a tempestuous morning was addressed as follows by a
recent appointee to the English bench: "Mr. Wright, I have carefully considered the objection you raised before the adjournment and consulted my
learned brother, and we are both agreed that I ought to overrule it. And
I may say for your assistance that if in the course of the case you make any
other ojections, I shallfeel it my duty to overrule those also."'6 Nobody went
to sleep, though, while Wright was performing, and the same can be said
of Thorne before the courts of Ames.
His opening was mild enough in the case we are reviewing. The collision, he said, had occurred at dusk in a street intersection. The chauffeur
driving his client's car had been killed. An action for wrongful death was
pending, but the executrix had decided that it would be inadvisable to
associate the trial of her case with the trial of the present one. (Something
like a snort was heard from Mr. Stout at this point; his expression indicated belief that the executrix had made a wise choice.) There had, however, been a passenger in the plaintiff's car. This passenger's version of
the occurrence would be given (an unmistakable snort from Mr. Stout this
time, accompanied by a glare which suggested: "Over my dead body!")or perhaps it would be fairer to say that the passenger's version would be
6

Parry, My Own Way 43-44 (1932).
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offered. And so on. Mr. Stout elected to postpone his opening, intimating
darkly that it might become superfluous.
Mr. Thorne then called and had sworn a single witness, stating that
others, if needed, would be produced later. The witness, one Saner, was a
tall, square-shouldered fellow, with a tanned face and an air of expectant
amusement. Seemingly accustomed to the witness box, he described himself as a physician engaged in treatment of mental cases at a well-known
mountain sanitarium, and settled back for the first real question.
"Dr. Saner," said Thorne, "can you tell us whether any patient was
received at the sanitarium in the morning of December i8, 1938?"
The judge remembered that, according to the opening, this was the day
following the accident.
"Yes,' said the doctor, "one and only one."
"And that patient was?"
Dr. Saner gave a name which startled the judge-Bernard Galsworthy
Wells. The papers would have liked this information in December, 1938.
Mr. Wells stood high in the field of authorship.
"We shall prove, your Honor," said Thorne, "possibly by this witness,
that Mr. Wells was the passenger in my client's car at the time of the
collision."
"Just one moment." Mr. Stout rose majestically, like a heavyweight
champion issuing from his corner; there was menace in his aspect. "I
should like to know how my friend intends to establish the identity of this
passenger-if there was any passenger-by the testimony of Dr. Saner. Is
it asserted that the doctor witnessed the accident?"
"Oh, not at all," responded Thorne cheerfully, "but Mr. Wells told him
all about it."
Mr. Stout changed with impressive deliberation from a heavyweight
champion to an offended deity in whose presence sacrilege has occurred.
Words formed behind his lips. His mouth opened. But Thorne, still very
cheerful, cut in:
"I might say, your Honor, that if we come to grips on this particular
aspect of the issue we shall miss the fundamentally interesting point.
Suppose I pass momentarily the question of identifying the passengerfor that I have an alternative witness to whose testimony even Mr. Stout
cannot object-and make a specific offer of proof in respect of a matter
upon which I cannot produce other reliable testimony. I propose to show
by Dr. Saner that Mr. Wells is in an emotional state, as a result of this
collision, which makes it inadvisable, to say the least, that he should be
subjected to the ordeal of testifying. I propose next to offer, again through
Dr. Saner, testimony and memoranda of a highly detailed statement or
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series of statements made by Mr. Wells, while at the sanitarium, with
regard to the unfortunate event which caused him to go there for treatment."
"And I," thundered Mr. Stout, more than ever the affronted deity,
"shall object to the admission of any such testimony by Dr. Saner on the
ground that it would be hearsay, the alleged statements not having been
made in the presence of my client and not being part of the res gestae."
"Certainly I do not mean to suggest that they were part of the res
gestae," responded Thorne sweetly. "I am mindful of the remark by Mr.

justice Holmes that, in place of using that term, he preferred to give
articulate reasons for his decisions. 7 In fact, I mean to avoid the Latin
language entirely and stick to English. I contend that my brother, in
resting his objection upon the ground of hearsay, is really giving a false
name to the principle he invokes."
Mr. Stout hung fire for a second. The remark about articulate reasons
had at the same time stung him badly and borne in upon him the fact that
he did not know how to define res gestae. Now he began to wonder whether
he could define hearsay. At this point the young man who served as Mr.
Stout's junior, so meek and mouse-like that he had not hitherto caught the
judge's attention, slipped a sheet of paper into his chief's hand. Mr. Stout
glanced at the sheet, returned it to the junior, and proceeded with confidence:
"This discussion seems astoundingly rudimental, to speak charitably of
it. The nature of hearsay is so well understood that Wigmore does not
trouble to define the word. However, to enlighten my friend, I suggest the
agreement of all the best modern authorities on the general proposition
that the hearsay rule excludes evidence of a declaration by a person not
under oath and subject to cross-examination in the very case, if that evidence be offered to prove the truth of the matters declared. Now that is
exactly what we have here. If I understand Mr. Thorne, the declarant
Wells is unable to stand up under cross-examination."
"If the Court will permit me to make an offer of proof, my contention
will become clear," responded Thorne.
"Is this important?" queried the judge.
"Fundamentally so."
"Then I think your offer had best be made out of the jury's hearing. We
have only thirty minutes left. Are you likely to consume that length of
time in argument on the matter?"
The usual wrangle followed as to whether the matter would consume
7Mr. Thorne apparently obtained his information about this remark of Mr. Justice Holmes
from the American article on "Evidence" in the 14th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
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three minutes or three hours. Finally the hours had it and the judge excused witness and jurors for the day.
"Now," said Thorne, "here, your Honor, is my offer:
"Dr. Saner can and will qualify as an expert in mental ailments. He
will testify that Mr. Wells, after arriving at the sanitarium, was put under
his special care; that in the course of treatment he found it advisable to
obtain from his patient a full account of the accident involved in this case;
that this included a description of the street intersection and its surroundings (we can prove, incidentally, that Mr. Wells saw the place once and
only once, namely, at the time of the collision); that Dr. Saner carefully
checked this description by personal observation on the spot; that from
this check and from other matter elicited during treatment Dr. Saner
reached the conclusion that Mr. Wells is a man of singular accuracy of perception, great power of memory and exact expression, and extreme truthfulness."
"And then," interjected Mr. Stout with elaborate irony, "I suppose you
will suggest that Dr. Saner be given sole occupancy of the jury box for the
purpose of rendering a plaintiff's verdict?"
"Not at all. Although he is an expert-"
"An expert in veracity?" sneered Stout.
"For the purposes of this case, exactly so. But although he is an expert,
the jury will be entitled to determine his credibility, and he will have
given them the material for determining the credibility of Mr. Wells and
the desirability or undesirability of accepting his story of the unhappy
event which led to this litigation. I propose to your Honor that in this
case, at least, what my brother has spoken of as a problem of hearsay is
really a problem of opinion. The only possible reason for keeping out evidence of Mr. Wells' statement is that under the circumstances the jury are
deprived of the information for forming their own opinion of his credibility
which would be furnished if he could take the stand subject to the standard sanctions of testimonial evidence, particularly cross-examination by
my brother." And he bowed to Mr. Stout, who remained stonily unresponsive. "Instead, we offer corresponding information in really better
form through the medium of a singularly appropriate witness. If evidence
of the declarations be kept out, I venture to say the ruling must constitute
a holding that although we accept expert opinion testimony on a thousand
matters, great and small, it is improper to accept such testimony, even in
most cogent shape, with respect to the matter of human veracity."
"Well, what do you think of it, Mr. Stout?" asked the judge, who himself thought the whole thing sounded wildly unconventional.
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Mr. Stout paused, as if searching his mind for words in which to express
his disgust. At length he found three:
"Preposterous, grotesque, ludicrous."
"Would the Court like to consider my precedents?" inquired Thorne.
"If any," interpolated Stout.
"Well, I suggest, your Honor, that the case of the lifted eyelid is in
point.8 There are elements of distinction, but not fundamental ones."
This cryptic description delightfully suggested a bit of facial surgery
or a cynical detective novel to the judge, and evidently suggested nothing
at all to Mr. Stout. Satan entered the judicial mind. The judge yielded to
temptation:
"Ah, yes-possibly; still, I feel a certain difficulty. Mr. Stout, do you
think that case fundamentally distinguishable from this?"
Stout gulped but held his ground: "I see nothing in common whatever."
"Yes, but in just what particulars is there divergence?"
Stout gulped twice, turned brick red, and stood mute. He was well supplied with citations of cases holding that, while an attending physician
may testify to the patient's assertions of contemporaneous physical sensation, he may not testify to the patient's account of the cause of an injury.
But there was not a lifted eyelid in a carload of this stuff. Stout's junior
rooted frantically in a brief case; less like a mouse than a terrier down a
rat hole, thought the judge. Mr. Stout certainly smelled a rat, but knew
not what to do about it. The silence became oppressive.
"I fancy," said Thorne smoothly, with no outward sign of his inward
and far from Heavenly bliss, "that your Honor has in mind this detail
which causes hesitation: The child-who, it must be remembered, was
too young to testify-was present in court so that the jury could observe
her actions when she illustrated her inability to dose the damaged eye.
Consequently her performance might be thought of as a bit of real evidence, something like, say, a motion picture, supplementing but independent from the expert testimony of the physician as to the extent to
which the injury had impaired her power to dose the eye. But the court
said-and this seems to me particularly significant-that 'the demonstration may be regarded as a part of the physician's testimony and under the
sanction of his oath.'9 Indeed, that interpretation is forced on us and
made available for use in connection with the situation at bar by a case
decided in the same state, Connecticut, during 1940.10 In that later case
the appellate court took the trial judge to task, although it did not re-

9 Friedler v. Hekeler,

96 Conn. 29,

112

10 State v. McLaughlin, 126 Conn.

257,

Atl. 65Y

(1921).
9 Ibid., at 33264, io A. (2d) 758, 761 (i94o).
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verse, for his instruction that the jury might obtain material for otherwise unavailable inferences by observing a witness in some other part of
the court-room than the witness box. The opinion says that the trier of
fact is entitled to take into account his observations of the demeanor of a
witness only to the extent of such genuine and spontaneous reactions on
the latter's part while occupying the stand as bear upon the credibility of
his testimony given under oath.' Thus it would seem that the testimony
of the expert as to the sincerity of the child's efforts to dose her eye was
from a technical point of view the important matter in the earlier case, and
that, except for the purpose of dramatic effect, he might just as well have
asked the child in his office to show how far she could draw down her
eyelid and have presented to the court his view as to whether she had tried
her best to obey the request. So, while the situation was rudimentary, I
think it fairly comparable with the one covered by my offer of proof in the
present case."
By this time the mouse-terrier junior had emerged from his brief case
clutching three or four papers, which he urgently handed to Mr. Stout
with whispered explanations. Wisely avoiding attempts to deal directly
with lifted eyelids, Stout crashed into a counter-attack.
"If the Court please, we should like to call attention to a substantial
series of New York decisions, running over a stretch of forty-nine years, in
which the testimony of alienists as to the sanity or insanity of criminal
defendants was held inadmissible when based upon hearsay histories of the
defendants' behavior. I quote briefly from People v. Strait, decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1896: 'The witness was an expert on diseases of the mind, but he was not an expert on determining the facts,
where such facts had to be obtained from the statements of others .....
He might have been deceived by a false statement prepared for the occasion and for the purpose of making him a valuable witness at the trial.' ,,X2
Thorne thought he knew the answer to that one: "In these New York
cases, your Honor, many of the statements of fact were made to the
alienists by persons other than the defendants. There is no showing whatever that the alienists attempted any intelligent study of the mentality,
xxMr. Thorne here combined two statements made in the McLaughlin opinion, and perhaps
pressed the interpretation a bit strongly his way. But this opinion in explaining Friedler v.
Hekeler, 96 Conn. 29, 112 Ati. 651 (1921), although it speaks of "a demonstration ....
carried to the point of using the child as a witness," concludes by saying "we held that this
could only be permissible under the sanction of the oath administered to the doctor conducting
the demonstration."
x2148 N.Y. 566, 570, 42 N.E. 1045, 1045-46 (i896). Another citation on the sheets of
Stout's junior was People v. Keough, 276 N.Y. 141, 144, ii N.E. (2d) 570, 572 (1937).
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let alone credibility, of these third parties. And, even so far as the statements were made out of court by the defendants themselves, it does not
appear that the experts scientifically studied credibility,however carefully
they may have worked on the problem of sanity. Now I respectfully suggest that here we have, by virtue of Dr. Saner's meticulous check on Mr.
Wells' credibility, something at least roughly analogous to the scale-ticket
and thermometer cases, and in consequence testimony which is properly
admissible."
At this point in his remarks Thorne was standing directly behind opposing counsel. He paused to observe the effect of his last dart. The back
of Mr. Stout's neck turned first a rich red and then purple. Thorne felt
sure that the front elevation must be equally worthy of critical attention.
The judge, horrified by the hue of Stout's face, hastily yielded to qualms of
conscience:
"Come, come, counsellor, once is enough for a single afternoon. Tell us
what those cases are and don't trifle with our blood-pressure."
"Suppose I describe the scale-ticket case, 3 it being the more striking of
the two," said the unabashed Thorne. "That was an action by a woman
for personal injuries in which it was material to prove that since the injury
she had lost weight. The trial judge allowed her husband to testify that
when she stepped on a penny-in-the-slot scale and inserted a coin, the
scale disgorged a ticket which said: 'Your weight is so many pounds.' The
objection that the testimony embodied hearsay14 was overruled. Yet obviously the objection was as soundly phrased as that by Mr. Stout in the
present proceedings. The operation of the scales constituted an assertion
of fact which was reliable or unreliable according to the accuracy and
integrity with which the workmen who constructed or from time to time
adjusted the internal machinery had performed their duties. The court
was in substance taking judicial notice of the dependability of manufacture and adjustment.'5 Here I am not asking judicial notice of the precision and comprehensiveness of Mr. Wells' observation, memory, or expression. I am offering convincing expert evidence on all these matters. My
case is stronger for admissibility than was the scale case. It cannot be distinguished on the ground that the latter involved the working of a
mechanical device, for the accuracy of that device rested upon the craftsmanship of human beings never called to the stand."
'3

De Filippo v. Di Pietro, 265 Mass. z86, 163 N.E. 742 (1928).

r4 That the objection was on this ground is only implied in the report and the record.
Defendant's brief puts the point as a hearsay problem.
'sSee Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 Harv. L. Rev. Xi38, 1 45-46 (i935).
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"Where," asked Stout, now returned to approximately his normal hue
of countenance, "where and when was your scale-ticket case decided?"
"Massachusetts, 1928."

"Ah," Stout went on with dangerous suavity, "and do you mean to tell
us that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, under Mr. Chief
Justice Rugg, indulged in the kind of speculation with which you have
been regaling us?"
Thorne inwardly thanked heaven that his use of the scale-ticket case
had in it the elements of a mouse-trap play on the football field. He said:
"Counsellor, your suspicions are justified. So far as I can tell from the
report, the record, and the briefs, this analysis never seemed necessary to
any of the persons involved. The dispute centers on the issue: 'Did the
husband actually see the transaction which produced the scale-ticket and
read the ticket himself, or did his wife tell him how she got the ticket or
what it said?' The opinion assumes that he saw the card issue from the
scale and asserts that in consequence of this assumption his testimony
stood 'on the same footing as testimony of the indication of the weight
upon an ordinary platform scale." 6 The fundamental analysis is implied
only. But this is probably because that analysis was made familiar by the
thermometer case as long ago as 1896. There Judge Given of the Supreme
Court of Iowa, in a somewhat intricate situation, treated the problem of
proving temperature in connection with a 'flash test' of oil, and sustained
the admission of evidence of what a thermometer had registered, although
recognizing that its scale was 'but the unsworn statements of the manu'I 7
facturer.' My analysis is directly derived from his."
Thorne's mousetrap had a hole in it, as he later frankly admitted to the
judge in his memorandum of authorities. The Given opinion appears in
the Northwestern Reporter only and not in the Iowa reports, the court's
views being presented in the latter place by Mr. Justice Robinson, under
whose hands the result remained the same, but with reasoning less forthright and dear.,8 Stout, however, was running no risk of being sideswiped again, and went off on another line.
"But the scale case," contended he, rising belligerently as Thorne
paused, "and the thermometer case as well, involved the operations of
groups of men engaged in the discharge of business duties, accurate from
habit, probably to some extent checking on each other's work, and with
no personal interest which might tempt them to maladjustment of the
16De Filippo v. Di Pietro 265 Mass. 186, 188, 163 N.E. 742, 743 (1928).
X
"Hatcher v. Dunn, 66 N.W. 9o5, 9o8 (1896).
8Hatcher v. Dunn, io2 Iowa 4'1, 418-19, 71 N.W. 343, 345 (i897).
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scales or the thermometer. Each scale-ticket, each reading of the thermometer, resembled somewhat a postponed entry in the course of business
duty."
"Now that," exclaimed Thorne, "is a downright ingenious distinction!
But what will my brother say to the cases in which confessions although
obtained under conditions of pressure or inducement which render them
likely to be false and therefore would normally have made them inadmissible, are nevertheless received because circumstantial evidence indicates
truthfulness of part of the confessing person's assertions and thus makes
possible an intelligent appraisal of the rest?"' 9
"My reply is that the investigation for corroborating circumstances is
normally made by the police, who apply systematic and time-proved
methods."
"Which is just what Dr. Saner will testify he applied in the present
instance," responded Thorne. "I can also refer to other lines of authority,
none precisely in point but all having a valuable bearing. First, in connection with what is commonly entitled the impeachment and rehabilitation
of witnesses it is recognized as perfectly orthodox and proper to put before
the jury evidence of community reputation for truth and veracity,o evidence of convictions for crime,2 evidence of pardons,22 and so on, all in
forms immensely more difficult for the jury's intelligent appraisal than the
proposed testimony of Dr. Saner."
"But," cut in Stout, "none of this material is employed to accomplish
the admission or rejection of testimony. It is intended purely to qualify
the effect of testimony concededly admissible.
"Passing that point, let me add that the verification Mr. Thorne offers
has already, in part at least, been held improper. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dealt last January with a
criminal case involving an issue of identification.2 The government's wit-

ness on this issue had seen from her window what was apparently part of
the action in the crime, nearly 200 feet away. To bolster her testimony the
government offered, and the trial judge admitted, testimony by law enforcement officers that they had been able from the identity witness's
window to recognize individuals at the scene of the crime. The appellate
court says that this supplementary evidence was improperly admitted."
x93 Wig-more, Evidence § 856 et seq. (3d ed. 194o).
20Ibid., § 922 et seq.

21

Ibid., § 980.

2 On this point Thorne probably overstated his case. See 4 ibid., § i x6(3). Additional
references are given in Morgan and Maguire, Cases on Evidence 99 n. i (1934).
23 Ippolite

v. United States, io8 F. (2d) 6 8, 67o-71 (C.C.A. 6th

194o).
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"That episode," Thorne promptly replied, "isunlike the present one.
There the supporting evidence was intended to bear out the claim that the
identity witness not only could observe but had observed relevant events
from her window. The conditions of verification were unfair to the defendant. The enforcement officers knew in advance what kind of thing to
look for and when and where to look, were skilled in observation, and thus
were likely to have used their eyes more effectively than the identity witness. Here the conditions of verification, if unfair to anybody, are unfair
to my client. The question is not whether Mr. Wells could see, but whether
his story, checked against persisting facts, shows that he did see and remember accurately. His observations, made in haste, excitement, and unfamiliarity, are critically tested by a shrewd observer, working coolly and
at his leisure. And they pass the test. Hence I argue that as to facts contemporaneously observed, but not persisting, the jury may reasonably
conclude that Mr. Wells saw straight and has talked straight."
"That seems a good answer," commented the judge. "Have you anything more at this stage, Mr. Stout?"
"Yes, your Honor, a case in Maryland held it improper for a prosecutor
to bring to the jury's attention that a defense witness had previously given
substantially identical testimony in his own behalf and been disbelieved
' 24
by a bench of three judges"Who," interpolated Thorne, "had not qualified as psychological experts and were not available for cross-examination as to just what they
had decided or why."
"I think, your Honor," roared Stout with every appearance of deep
indignation, "that common professional courtesy should lead my brother
to let me finish my remarks without an insinuated gloss. But, since he has
spoken, I invite his and the Court's attention to the New Mexican case in
which it was held error to permit the committing magistrate who narrated
a confession by the defendant to go on and state that he found beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty, thus expressing his approval
of the confession and of other testimony given for the State at the pre2
liminary hearing." 5
"I hardly think the magistrate had enjoyed Dr. Saner's specialized
training and long experience in searching the human mind," commented
Thorne. "Certainly both your Honor and Mr. Stout are aware of the respectable modem cases holding that a primary witness may properly be
24Newton v. State, 147 Md. 71, 89, 127 AtI. 123, 3x (1924); cf. Green v. State, 16i Md. 75,
83-87, 1.5 AtI. 164, 167-69 (1931).
2' State v. Paiz, 34 N. Mex. io8, 109, 277 Pac. 966 (1929). See also State v. Shumpert,
iiS.E. (2d) 523, 527 (S.C. 1940).
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impeached by expert testimony that he or she is a pathological falsifier or
the like.26 Why should we employ the advances of science only for the purpose of belittling evidence? Why not let them be used with other liberalizing factors to increase the quantity of relevant and useful information put
to our jury? It is an unhappy characteristic of modern so-called civilization that technical achievements are perverted. No sooner do we learn to
navigate the air than aviators drive us underground to escape their bombs.
I am asking this court to reverse the vicious process and put scientific
progress to constructive use."
"Well, gentlemen," said the judge, not too much moved by this outburst, "I think I see what is going on here. Mr. Thorne is utilizing-of
course with the highest motives-the peculiar facts of this situation to
frame a test case and Mr. Stout and his client and I are in a sense stooges."
Mr. Stout, although gratified by his Honor's blunt description of the state
of things, could not help feeling miffed at being called a stooge. However,
he held his peace. The judge went on: "You both know my practice of
dictating memorandum decisions in the presence of counsel. Now in this
case at the present moment I am not sure which way I shall decide. So, I
propose that each of you now dictate to the court stenographer the memorandum he would like me to use. The stenographer will run the memoranda off in time for me to take home with me-can you do it, Miss Spencer?
.... Yes, I'll hold down the length ..... All right, good for you-and I
shall make my ruling when we start again at ten o'clock tomorrow. Suppose you begin, Mr. Thorne; and remember what Miss Spencer said-this
has got to be short."
"Very well, sir," answered Thorne, and commenced to rise.
"Oh, don't get up unless you dictate better on your feet." Thorne subsided gratefully, stretched out his legs, slumped in his chair until he was
sitting on the small of his back, fixed his eyes on the ceiling, and opened
his mouth. But his Honor was not quite finished: "And I want to say
this, too. It seems to me you are putting to me a freak situation. It may
get into the newspapers. I don't like that, unless my decision is really
going to count for something. What can you answer to reassure me?"
"I can speak more frankly, sir, if what I say forms no part of the
memorandum. This is indeed a freak situation. It may never come up
again. But it is a situation tending and justly tending to cause sympathetic
judicial consideration of my fundamental proposition that, analytically, a
great deal of hearsay ought to be treated under a wise application of the
doctrines governing opinion, rather than under an independent doctrine.
26
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The vice of many test cases is that their facts appeal to neither the intellects nor the emotions of the courts which hear them. They tempt unfavorable decisions, and obstruct progress instead of furthering it. I have
patiently waited for circumstances which enable me to avoid that vice.
My hope is that a decision in favor of admissibility under these remarkable
facts may gradually come to be applied in conditions less and less extraordinary, until finally the applications open for admission of so-called
hearsay an avenue along which can travel not only evidence of declarations supported by worthy opinion testimony as to the credibility of the
declarants but also evidence of declarations whenever accompanied by
sufficient showings of the setting or background against which the utterances occurred to enable the jury intelligently to appraise their value.
Your Honor will observe the breadth and importance of such a principle.
It would admit, in addition to evidence of such declarations as seemed to
have a singularly high degree of credibility, evidence of many only moderately credible, or even lower in the scale of veracity, yet still possessed
of appreciable potential probative power."
"Very pretty alliteration," said the judge with critical literary approval.
"Yes, I see your point. Conceivably there may be something to it. Get
along with your dictation."
"You do the right headings on the memo, Miss Spencer," began
Thorne, "and run the body of it this way:
"The witness Saner has qualified as an expert on mental disease. He
has testified and I find that Bernard Galsworthy Wells is suffering from a
serious nervous breakdown, and that this condition would be prolonged
and recovery would become more doubtful if Wells attempted to testify in
this litigation. I therefore find that Wells is unavailable as a witness.
"Saner, who has closely and carefully studied the veracity of the
declarant Wells under conditions favorable to such study, and who has
exceptional qualifications for the task, is offered to state to the jury, first,
the nature and extent of his inquiry and the findings thereon, and, second,
certain relevant declarations of fact, a number of them embodied in contemporaneous written records, uttered by Wells with reference to the
issues in the litigation.
"The problem of admissibility thus presented is novel to the extent that
it has rarely if ever been ruled upon in this particular form, but there are
analogous precedents which I cite in a footnote."
7
"What's that-footnotes?" cried the judge. "I don't like them."-2
"But they're all the fashion now in judicial opinions," explained
27

Neither, it seems, does John W. Davis. See Davis, The Argdment of an Appeal, 26
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Thorne. "Mr. Justice Brandeis started the habit in the Supreme Court of
the United States over twenty years ago, and now nearly every one of the
Justices exercises it.2 8 The state courts have taken it up. Why, law professors now can hardly tell the difference between their own articles for the
legal magazines and the opinions the judiciary is turning out. Confidentially, my own view is that the judges were jealous of the professors, and
9
are using this form to convey the idea that they are equally learned.2
"Besides, to be purely utilitarian, in the present case the footnote will
save a lot of time. My memorandum of authorities is so arranged that
Miss Spencer can turn it into a note by prefixing an asterisk or a superior
figure or whatever she thinks best."
"All right, all right," conceded the judge. "But what's going to be in
your note?"
"The order of material is this: The scale-ticket and thermometer cases;
a case or two on the use of so-called lie-detectorsO (I did not mention these
in argument, because evidence of this kind has rarely thus far been admitted except by mutual consent; but the very fact that mutual consent
was obtained and that the courts countenanced the evidence shows that it
has some standing; and of course this semi-mechanical means of presentation fits in nicely on the transition from machines to human opinion); then
Friedlerv. Hekeler, the case of the child's eyelid; next, cases on corroboration of confessions to get in some of those otherwise inadmissible; and
finally all the analogous material about impeachment and rehabilitation
of witnesses."
Thorne paused to get his breath. The ensuing silence jerked the judge's
thought into sharp focus on a matter about which he had been dimly conscious for several minutes-the absence of a brooding and disapproving
presence. Leaning forward, he thrust his head over the front edge of the
barrier before him, and addressed the clerk on the lower level:
"What's happened to Mr. Stout? He's gone."
"Yes, sir, I know. He tried to catch your eye, but did not succeed. He
seemed annoyed. At last he told me that his presence at these proceedings
was apparently unnecessary. He left his memorandum of authorities, and
told me what he would have Miss Spencer write out. Then he and his
junior went away."
29 Mr. Thorne's assertion must be taken with a grain of salt; but recent volumes of United
States reports certainly carry much heavier documentation in footnote form than did those of
the first two decades of the century.
'9 On the contrary, it may well be contended that such members of the court as Justices
Douglas, Frankfurter, and Stone brought professorial habits with them to the bench.
30 See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 999 et circa ( 3 d ed. ig4o).
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"Humph," said the judge. "And what does he want Miss Spencer to
write?"
"Well, just two words, sir-it was short, he said, but quite enough. The
words are: 'Evidence excluded.'"
"Gracious," said his Honor, "that's about the most pointed thing Mr.
Stout has ever said. I don't think he likes the conduct of this case. The
situation has become very irregular indeed, with no counsel for the defense
present. I wonder if we ought to stop. But I don't think we will. Let's go
ahead and finish this memorandum."
The judge now saw that more than defense counsel had departed. The
spectators' benches were vacant save for a placid and probably slumbering
person in ragged raiment at the right-hand rear corner. Not a lawyer was
within the bar enclosure except Thorne. The court officer dozed in his
little box at the side of the room. The judge felt lonely.
"Do you know," he remarked, "I think I'll come down from here so
things won't be so formal and distant." Suiting the action to the word,
he gathered up the skirt of his heavy silk robe and negotiated the steps to
the court room floor. Somehow a table seemed a better place to sit than a
chair. He tried it, but the robe got in the way. He took the robe off.
"Now," he said, comfortably swinging his legs, "get on with your business, so we can all go home."
Thorne gave tongue:
"Even if these precedents did not exist, there appears to be no reason
for hesitating to deal with the issue in the light of reason and present
scientific knowledge. A well-known opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States, written by the progressive Mr. Justice Sutherland-"
"Here, hold on!" cried the judge. "I respect Mr. Justice Sutherland,
but you can't possibly call him progressive."
"My only choice, sir, was between 'progressive' and 'radical.' The latter
word attracted me, for in this case the Justice rooted out of the federal
judicial system a restrictive rule of evidence from which I venture to say
that no state had ever succeeded in freeing itself save by legislation.31 The
opinion is a bold one. But somehow I don't think Mr. Justice Sutherland
would enjoy being described as a radical. So I use the milder term. Do
you insist that I strike it out?"
A sudden impulse of benevolent tolerance swept through the judge.
With the glowering Mr. Stout removed he had a delightful sense of intellectual freedom. He hadn't felt so untrammeled since his days of fierce
theoretical disputation in law school. He said largely:
31Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 37, (1933); cf. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
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"Oh, no, never mind. Go on. I can change the word later if it still
seems inappropriate."
Thorne continued:
"-by the progressive Mr. Justice Sutherland, emphasizes the pride of
common lawyers in the 'flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation' of their legal system. The opinion says:
The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are to
rest upon reason-is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.
And since experience is of all teachers the most dependable, and since experience
also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at one time thought
necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding
generation whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule.3
This wise and dignified pronouncement furnishes ample intellectual warrant to other courts for improving the rules of proof so far as their shortcomings can be demonstrated. And as, in the present connection, the demonstration must begin somewhere, it may as well begin here."
"Shades of John Parker," murmured the judge.
"Quite right, sir," answered Thorne. "And I need not add the comment that as Captain Parker's cause could only be carried to success by a
revolution, so nothing short of revolutionary activity can clear away the
multitudinous absurdities countenanced by our current law of evidence.
New paragraph, Miss Spencer:
"Accordingly, I rule that Dr. Saner may testify and note the defendant's exception."
An indefinable sensation of uplift had taken tight hold of the judge. He
rose in spirit above the obstructed horizon of middle age and glimpsed
once more the wide visions of youth. He also glimpsed a curious phenomenon right in the courtroom. Opposite his table, above the central
door, was a decorative plaster panel bearing in low relief a symbolic figure
of Justice. The lady as usual bore a pair of scales and had her eyes bound
with a gilded bandage. As the judge looked at Justice, some freakish,
slanting beam of the afternoon sun caught the face at an angle and created
an illusion that the bandage was gone. The lady's eyes, clear, penetrating,
and encouraging, seemed to look squarely into those of the judge. The
judge, of course, had always known the symbolism of the blindfold as
applied to figures of Justice. Yet he liked it not. To him, a blind tribunal
weighing a case seemed as silly as a blind butcher weighing the Sunday
roast. Well, he thought, why shouldn't I do something to strip that covering away and make Justice a bit less fumbling? A thrill of potential
3Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
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achievement coursed up and down his spine. He felt magnificently exalted. justice continued to look at him steadily. Suddenly, though, there
came a flickering in the beam of sunlight. Perhaps the windshield of some
motor car squeezing toward the curb flashed a rival ray. The influence on
justice was startling. Adroitly, smoothly, definitely she winked one eye
at His Honor. The sunbeam vanished, justice's eyes disappeared behind
her bandage, the judge came back to earth with an almost audible thump.
"No, sir! No, sir!" he exclaimed accusingly to Thorne. "Not a bit of it!
I may let your testimony in-I don't know yet. But I won't use any
memorandum with that sort of high-flying peroration in it. What would
the Seven Septuagenarians on the Seventh Floor think of me if the case
went to them on appeal?"
"Probably your Honor is correct," responded Thorne resignedly. "The
Supreme Court which your Honor thus aptly describes is not noted for its
warm human enthusiasms. It yearns for technical interest. But I think
the first part of the memorandum would offer plenty of points for the
technician."
"All the same," said the judge, now thoroughly reduced to his normal
emotional state, "Heaven help your client on that appeal."
"My client," said Thorne, rising and bowing slightly, "is reconciled to
the worst. Good afternoon and thank you for hearing me."
In the language of the detective story preamble, my characters are completely fictitious, and any resemblances between any of them and any real
person living or dead is purely accidental. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely
that the most ingenious could work out a convincing likeness. No young
lawyer would be so brash and ready and unconventional as the imaginary
Mr. Thorne. No veteran of the courts could possibly be so choleric and
stupid and easily disturbed as the imaginary Mr. Stout. Above all, nobody gracing the Bench would behave as does my fanciful judge. If he
belonged to an elective judiciary, he would be too much in fear of losing
his seat at the next election; and if he belonged to an appointive judiciary,
he would be too apprehensive lest an aroused populace find in his conduct
a reason for replacing appointment with the elective system. In short, the
whole bit of synthetic history is an extravaganza. It is worth while,
though, to remind ourselves even by extravaganza that the forwarding of
measures, in legal reform at least, is a job of working on men. And at
any rate the citations are real, and the combination in which they are
placed gives a certain justification for the proposed conclusion. Somewhere within this wreathing smoke of fancy may lurk a spark of realistic
truth.

